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I. INTRODUCTION
One of this country's most intractable problems has been the physical separation of the places of residence of the various economic
classes in our society. A convincing case can be made that our present
system of class separation poses some serious dangers for the future of
the country. I rest this on well known facts concerning the plight of
the underclass in the United States. Among that group, there has
been a particularly severe deterioration in the state of the family,
marked by an increase in the absolute number of and proportion of
illegitimate births, and like increases in the number of families headed
by single females. The causes of these phenomena are undoubtedly
numerous, but the precipitous flight of the middle classes from central
* Robert J. Kutak Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
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city areas no doubt is a contributing factor. The absence of middle
class role models makes it very difficult for persons growing up in areas that are dominated by members of the economic underclass to assimilate the traditional values of family, education, and the work
ethic. The mor~s of some inhabitants of the inner city are characterized by the absence of traditional job-holding, the presence of promiscuous sexual liaisons with a concomitant increase in illegitimacy, and
the use of and trade in illicit drugs. Among many of the young, these
mor~s tend to predominate over the more conventional ones and thus
to be perpetuated. Whether the insertion of the persons with these
destructive characteristics into every urban and suburban residential
neighborhood in the United States would over time "solve" the problem and break the chain of cultural values among their offspring is, of
course, questionable. However, it is certainly arguable that this is the
only possible way it could be done in any reasonable period of time.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently tried to attack this great
social problem in the famous Mount Laurel cases. 2 In those cases, the
court ordered that the municipalities of the state undertake a series of
affirmative activities designed to remedy the problem. A court
presented with great social problems can sometimes rise to the occasion and within the acknowledged limits of its judicial power come up
with solutions that will command, over time, the almost universal respect of the polity. Such was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,3 Sometimes, however, courts
use poor judgment and faulty analysis in an attempt to solve difficult
social problems and thereby make a bad situation worse. It can be
convincingly argued that that was what happened in the Mount Laurel cases.
No one can question the motives of the members of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in their attempt to end economic segregation in the
state. If there are difficulties with the decisions, they lie not in the
judges' motives or good will, nor even in determining whether they
had the power to do what they did, for later events have made it clear
1. For a strong argument on this point see A. DOWNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS 50
(1973). There are, of course, a few who do not regard class separation as a problem at all. It has been argued, for example, that the market's allocation of where
people live may be the most "efficient" one and that it probably is the allocation
desired by most of our citizenry. See Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1198-1202 (1981). Ellickson argues that "upper-income groups disvalue the proximity of lower-income groups more than lowerincome groups value the proximity of upper-income groups." Id. at 1199.
2. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]; Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A. 2d 390 (1983), [hereinafter Mount Laurel II].
See also Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that they had the raw power. But in a democratic society it is not
always good judgment for governmental institutions to use their
power to its fullest extent. This is especially true of the courts, which,
commanding neither armies nor purse, completely depend, in the final
analysis, upon the support of the people for the reach of their writ.
There is no doubt that this support can be eroded or even lost when
the public perceives that the courts are trying to make policy in areas
4
where they feel their elected representatives should be dominant.
The court has received much criticism, both from the inside5 and the
outside 6 for the wide ranging, "legislative" nature of its Mount Laurel
opinions. Just as importantly, there is a serious question as to
whether the remedies, mandated by those cases, which the New
Jersey court held are required by the state constitution to be imposed
on the landowners, housing consumers and developers of the state,
may not actually be unconstitutional under the latest takings cases decided under the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court.7 Further, there is a serious question of their constitutionality under
traditional takings principles well established by state courts under
the law of subdivision exactions.
This Article is an attempt to carefully explore the Mount Laurel
cases, as representing an archetype of the judicial overreaching that
occurs when an activist court decides that a serious social problem
must be addressed by government, but a recalcitrant legislature, reflecting overwhelming public sentiment, refuses to do so. In the
course of this exploration, the Article will review in some detail the
holdings of these cases and what has occurred in the real world as a
result of them. Finally, the Article will examine whether these decisions really can stand up to rigorous constitutional analysis under the
takings clause.
II. MOUNT LAUREL I
In Mount Laurel I, the first decision in the series, plaintiffs sued
the defendant township of Mount Laurel to void its zoning ordinance
as violative of their rights to substantive due process and equal protection guaranteed by the New Jersey and United States constitutions.
The plaintiffs fell into four categories: (1) poor residents of Mount
4. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

5. See the opinions of Justices Clifford and Mountain in Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Rose, Waning JudicialLegitimacy: The Priceof JudicialPromulgation
of UrbanPolicy, 20 URB. LAW. 801 (1988).
7. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). The Nollan case is especially relevant.
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Laurel; (2) former residents forced to leave because of lack of suitable
housing; (3) nonresidents of nearby central cities desiring to move to
Mount Laurel; and (4) three organizations representing racial
minorities.
Mount Laurel was a developing town of twenty-two square miles
with a population of over 11,000 persons. At the time of the case,
about sixty-five percent of the land was vacant or in agricultural use.
According to the terms of the ordinance under attack, twenty-nine
percent of the land was zoned exclusively for industrial use. Most of
the remainder was zoned for single family detached dwellings with
minimum lot sizes of 9300 square feet and up, and minimum house
sizes of 900 to 1100 square feet and up. Recently, the town had permitted a limited number of cluster zoned single family dwellings and had
provided for and approved several planned unit developments having
some variety of housing and some retail. The trial court held that low
and moderate income families were unlawfully excluded from the
town and declared its zoning ordinance completely invalid as a denial
of equal protection.8 The court further ordered that the town make
studies of the housing needs of its present and former low and moderate income persons, and prepare a plan to meet those needs. The town
appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that the relief
should include a provision for persons who had no connection with the
town.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in an opinion by Justice Hall,
agreed that the town had not provided for the housing needs of lower
income persons and indeed had set up a system that effectively excluded them from new construction in the town. It was argued to the
court that the real purpose for excluding lower income persons was to
keep out minorities, a goal which, of course, would be vulnerable to
constitutional attack. However, the court accepted town counsel's assertion that the purpose animating those passing the zoning ordinance
was not to exclude minorities but to keep Mount Laurel a low property tax town. This could be done by: (1) keeping out low income families, who tend to have more children and thus to require higher
educational appropriations; (2) attracting middle and upper income
families, who have fewer children and pay higher taxes; and (3) bringing in light industries, which also pay high taxes and require little in
the way of municipal services. The court then noted that Mount Laurel's regulatory patterns were characteristic of virtually all developing
communities in the state. Since such municipalities act in the perceived interest of those seeking to keep property taxes low, the effect
is that the housing needs of the lower and moderate income people in
the entire region are left unmet.
8. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J.
Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:186

Reasoning from the above findings, the court reached these conclusions: Since housing was a basic necessity, proper provision for it in
New Jersey zoning ordinances was essential to meet the requirement,
imposed by both the state constitution and the zoning enabling act,
that zoning ordinances must promote the general welfare. Zoning ordinances have an effect outside the boundaries of the municipality enacting them, and therefore to promote the general welfare, the
welfare of persons living outside the town as well as the citizens living
within it must be recognized and served. The state legislature has in
numerous laws found a great need for decent low and moderate income housing. Mount Laurel's ordinance, preferring as it did higher
income classes over the low and moderate income groups, was not enacted for the general welfare and therefore was in violation of the basic constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws in the New Jersey Constitution.
It is interesting that the court used state rather than federal constitutional law as the basis for its decision; no doubt it wanted to avoid
the possibility of a review and reversal of its decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court. It is also noteworthy that the New Jersey Constitution does not have due process and equal protection clauses as such.
Instead, the New Jersey courts deduced those protections from the
general language of article 1, paragraph 1 of that document.9
After stating its constitutional arguments, the court articulated in
some detail the rules, with which a municipality must comply, for its
zoning ordinance to be deemed so promotive of the general welfare as
to be a valid exercise of the police power.
1. "[A] developing municipality... must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate
variety and choice of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there.., including those of low and moderate income." 10
2. "It must permit multi-family housing, without bedroom or similar restrictions, as well as small dwellings on very small lots, low cost
housing of other types and, in general, high density zoning, without
artificial and unjustifiable minimum requirements as to lot size, building size and the like .... 11
3. "The amount of land removed from residential use by allocation to industrial and commercial purposes must be reasonably related
9. N.J.S.A. Const. art. I, par. 1: "All persons are by nature free and independent,
and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
10. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
187, 336 A.2d 713, 731-32.
11. Id at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
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to the present and future potential for such purposes."'12
4. The developing municipality's obligation is "to afford the opportunity for decent and adequate low and moderate income housing
at least to" the extent of "the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need therefor."13
The court gave relatively little guidance to the lower courts as to
how to define the relevant "region" and the municipality's "fair share"
for the purpose of the above rules. No doubt it thought that the principles to determine those questions would be worked out in later cases
over a period of time. In the meantime, it concluded that Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance had to be modified in accordance with the above
standards in order to make it a valid exercise of the police power. It
gave the town ninety days (or more if the trial court so ordered) to
adopt the necessary amendments to its ordinances. If it failed to do so,
further judicial action could be sought by supplemental pleading in
the case.
Noteworthy is the fact that the supreme court refused to affirm the
trial court's holding that the defendant town had to devise a plan for
municipal affirmative action to satisfy the indicated housing needs. In
dealing with the problem of exclusionary zoning, the court could have
chosen to mandate, as a matter of state constitutional law, that the
municipalities use the inclusionary remedies that had been tried elsewhere. There had been a short history of the use of inclusionary devices (most notably the mandatory set-aside) by certain municipalities
scattered around the United States in the early 1970s.14 Essentially,
these were ordinances in which the city required that a small percentage (ten to twenty percent) of units in new developments be priced
below market for the benefit of low and moderate income persons.
Some cities relied on federal subsidy money, which was often not
forthcoming, to get the developers to build, and, as a result, the programs most often did not get off the ground. Other ordinances provided for "density bonuses." These allowed the builders to construct
units at greater densities than ordinarily allowed in the zone and
served as incentive to, and compensation for, the construction of the
desired below market price units. Only a few hundred of these units
had actually been constructed across the United States at the time of
12. I1.
13. Id. at 188, 336 A.2d at 732.
14. For the details of this history, see Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide
Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1036-67 (1976).
The authors relate the history of these devices in the early 1970s in such cities as

Boulder, CO, Los Angeles, CA, Berkeley, CA, Montgomery County, MD, Fairfax
County, VA, Palo Alto, CA, and Lewisboro, NY. See also Kleven, Inclusionary
Ordinances-Policyand Legal Issues in Requiring PrivateDevelopers to Build
Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432 (1974).
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Mount Laurel L15 Perhaps the court's hesitancy to use these devices
stemmed from the fact that they had been imposed by municipal ordinance rather than by judicial fiat. In that connection, it stated that
"[c]ourts do not build housing nor do municipalities"16 and that that
function is properly performed by private builders, various kinds of
associations, and government agencies created for the purpose. Eight
years later in Mount Laurel II, the court found itself taking a quite
different position, when it in fact imposed certain affirmative duties
on the towns and cities of New Jersey.
In the interim period between the two cases, however, some on the
court must have felt that they had created a sort of Frankenstein monster in the holdings of Mount Laurel I, because it was just three years
after that case that the court seemed to be in full retreat from them in
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison.1 7 No doubt this
was due, at least in part, to the political firestorm that arose after
Mount Laurel I.
III. OAKWOOD AT MADISON
In Oakwood at Madison, the court laid down some important limitations upon the original Mount Laurel decision. First, it reiterated
that "[m]unicipalities do not themselves have the duty to build or subsidize housing,"' 8 a concession that the court was later to at least partially retract in Mount Laurel II. More importantly it modified the
municipal duty to provide for low and moderate income housing. In
recognition of the criticism that without subsidy, it was impossible to
build such housing, it substituted a requirement that the cities provide
for "least-cost housing."1 9 At the same time it expressed some doubt
as to the validity of so called "density bonus" provisions in zoning ordinances that would allow developers a greater density in construction
of sale or rental housing in exchange for the developers' giving special
concessions in the sale price or monthly rent. The court felt that legislative authorization was probably necessary for such measures to be
valid.20 This is particularly ironic in view of its later holding in Mount
Laurel II that the use of such devices might be constitutionally
required.
15. Fox & Davis, supra note 14, at 1069.
16. Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 192, 336
A.2d 713, 734 (1975).
17. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
18. I& at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
19. I& at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207-08. By least-cost housing the court meant the lowest
priced housing "consistent with minimum standards of health and safety, which
private industry [would] undertake .... in amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficit
in the hypothesized fair share." I&
20. I& at 518, 371 A.2d at 1210.
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The court decided it should not try to articulate specific rules to
determine the relevant region and fair share for municipalities. Likewise towns would not be required to "devise specific formulae for estimating their precise fair share of the lower income housing needs of a
specifically demarcated region." 21 The court also refused a request
that it order the defendant town to take affirmative action to bring in
low income housing by making tax concessions or by sponsoring public
housing projects saying that they had "no lawful basis for imposing
22
such action as obligatory."
In one area, the court extended the reach of the Mount Laurel doctrine, creating what has become known as the builder's remedy. Noting that the corporate plaintiff had prevailed in two trials and on
appeal, it said that if all the relief plaintiff got after six years of litigation were a determination that the zoning ordinance was invalid, it
would be a pyrrhic victory indeed. It then proceeded to order the issuance of a building permit for the development sought by the plaintiff
in the first place. Included in the order was a requirement that plaintiff's permit be granted on the condition that at least twenty percent
of the dwellings be allocated to low and moderate income persons, presumably at a reduced price. 23 Plaintiff's original application for a
building permit contained that allocation as an element, and that undoubtedly was the reason that the court felt that plaintiff was attempting to vindicate its Mount Laurel policies in the lawsuit.
The court used the builder's remedy for obvious reasons. It felt
(although it did not in so many words say so) that unless a plaintiff,
which had spent many years in litigating the right to build some low
and moderate income housing, were finally permitted to get the relief
it sought, there would be no one willing to undertake such a lawsuit in
the future. It is clear that such is the case, for if the only relief courts
were to grant in exclusionary zoning cases were a judgment voiding
the town's ordinance, all the town would have to do would be to pass
another ordinance forbidding plaintiff's development but permitting
low and moderate income housing where it was unsuitable or where
the owner had no intention to build such housing.
In addition to ordering the trial court to grant a builder's remedy
on remand, the court ordered the court below to require the municipality to rezone
to create the opportunity for a fair and reasonable share of the least cost housing needs of Madison's region .... The revision shall as minima: (a) allocate
substantial areas for single-family dwellings on very small lots; (b) substantially enlarge the areas for dwellings on moderate sized lots; (c) substantially
enlarge the [multi-family] district or create other enlarged multi-family zones;
(d) reduce the [two and one acre minimum lot size] zones to the extent neces21. 1& at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200.
22. Id. at 546, 371 A.2d at 1224.
23. Id. at 551, 371 A.2d at 1227.
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sary to effect the foregoing... ; (e) modify the restrictions in the [multi-family] zones and PUD areas ... which discourage the construction of apartments
of more than two bedrooms; (f) modify the PUD regulations to eliminate...
undue cost generating requirements ... ; and (g) generally eliminate and reduce undue cost-generating restrictions in the zones allocated to the achievement of lower income housing in accordance with the principles of least cost
zoning ....24

Though it was clear that the majority opinion signaled a retreat
from the strictures of Mount Laurel I, it was also clear that it represented a compromise by the "moderates" between two other groups
having polar opposite positions on the major issues. On the one side
was Justice Pashman who argued in his concurring and dissenting
opinion for a more aggressive and even radical approach. Pashman
expressed impatience with the pace of change in the housing situation
for the poor in the developing towns. In Mount Laurel I, over Pashman's opposition, the court had held that the governments in the various developing municipalities should have an opportunity to improve
the situation without court supervision. Pasbinan believed that that
approach had been proven dead wrong and that it was time for the
25
courts to take a more active role in the process.
Pashman advocated a draconian series of remedies because he felt
the support for exclusionary zoning was strong and the result of "longstanding social and racial fears and prejudices." 26 Pashman's suggested judicial remedies included: (1) the setting of a fair share of low
and moderate income housing for the various towns in the state;2 7 (2)
ordering the towns to formulate a plan which would include proposed
changes in the zoning ordinance as well as affirmative action on the
part of the town such as "establishment of a local housing authority,
creation of a mobile home park district, imposition of inclusionary
conditions upon subdivision, PUD and cluster zone developments, or
provision of density bonuses and other inclusionary devices" 28 ; (3) ordering rezoning and granting of a building permit to developer litigants seeking to build housing for low and moderate income persons; 29
(4) ordering specific changes in offending municipal ordinances rather
than just invalidating them;30 (5) enjoining municipal approval of any
other development until it had "taken steps to provide for its fair
share of the regional housing need" 31; (6) ordering towns to provide
density bonuses and other incentives for building the desired hous24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 553, 371 A.2d at 1228.
I& at 560, 371 A.2d at 1231-32.
Id at
Id- at
Id at
Id- at
Id- at
Id at

562, 371 A.2d at 1232.
588-95, 371 A.2d at 1246-49.
584, 371 A.2d at 1244.
596-601, 371 A.2d at 1250-53.
609-10, 371 A.2d at 1256-57.
610-11, 371 A.2d at 1257.
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ing; 32 (7) ordering that towns condition any approval of large develop-

ments on an agreement by the builder that a certain percentage of the
units be for lower income residents (known as the "mandatory setaside,") 33; and (8) ordering the town to establish a local housing

authority. 34
Nothing could have been further from Pashman's approach to the
judicial function than that exhibited in Justice Clifford's concurring
opinion. Drawing from an article by Judge Simon Rifkind,35 Clifford
posited that there are two kinds of exercises of the judicial power: adversarial dispute resolution and problem solving. He quoted with approval various passages in the Rifkind article:
'The American public today perceives courts as jacks-of-all-trades, available to
furnish the answer to whatever may trouble us: Shall we build nuclear power
plants, and if so, where? Shall the Concorde fly to our shores? How do we
tailor dismissal and lay-off programs during the depression, without undoing
all of the progress achieved during prosperity by anti-discrimination statutes?
All these are now the continuous grist of the judicial mills.
'Thus, it is not surprising to learn that a lawsuit was recently filed in the
Southern District of New York seeking to prevent the United States Postal
Service from issuing a commemorative stamp honoring Alexander
Graham
36
Bell - on the grounds that someone else invented the telephone.
.... 'Problem solving is... a chancy business requiring, in a democracy,
not only wisdom and inventiveness but a keen perception of the political implications. Moreover, it imposes a duty upon the problem-solver to hear all
those who have a significant interest in the problem. Very frequently the
problem-solver tends to become a champion of a cause and not a neutral decider. His reward comes from popular acclaim, not from law review commendation. Despite this chasm which divides the problem-solver from the dispute
resolver there is a growing tendency to confuse the two.
'On the campuses, voices are heard which look benignly upon those areas
of our jurisprudence wherein courts have become problem-solvers. It is projected as the wave of the future. Indeed, new words have been coined to describe the judicial role. Courts have become mini-legislatures. Judges now
preside at proceedings in which there is no clear alignment of parties but at
which all who have so-called significant interest may have their say, and indeed they should since the decree will directly affect them by judgment and
not by precedent. Judges, being human, are not averse to their enlarged role
and expanded responsibility. It is exhilarating to administer relief to a universe of victims, and if some are unknown and unknowable, then to distribute
largesse to the deserving
by application of the cy-pres doctrine in the fashion
37

of Haroun Al-Rashid.'

In the end Justice Clifford threw up his hands in trying to recon32. Id. at 611-12, 371 A.2d at 1257-58.
33. Id at 612-14, 371 A.2d at 1258-59. This, as we shall see, became the predominant
method used in attempts to fulfill the Mount Laurel mandate.
34. Id. at 615-16, 371 A.2d at 1259-60.
35. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 15 JUDGES' J. 43 (1976).
36. I& at 44.
37. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,634,371 A.2d 1192,
1269 (1977).
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cile his conflicting views about the case- on the one hand, his conviction that the governmental zoning power was being improperly used
by the middle class to exclude the poor from certain towns, and, on the
other hand, his uneasiness about the proper limits of judicial powerand voted for the middle ground of the majority opinion. Justice Clifford was in effect saying to his colleagues, "What we are doing here is
probably morally correct but we are dangerously near to overextending the reach of the courts."
Perhaps even more dubious about judicial activism in this area was
Justice Mountain. In a strong concurring and dissenting opinion, he
expressed his many doubts about the course the court was embarking
upon. Basically, Mountain argued that the court was beginning to
carry on what was essentially a legislative function. If a court goes
beyond merely declaring a zoning ordinance unconstitutional "it invites the fairly certain prospect of being required itself to undertake
the task of rezoning." 38 Justice Mountain made it clear that he did not
think courts were competent to do that kind of work even with the
help of court-appointed masters who were experts in the area, because
there are simply no standards by which a court could proceed.
A principal weakness inherent in this approach is that no authoritative
guidelines exist at the present time to aid the trial judge and the planning
experts he has appointed, and to which the law would require that they adhere. Therefore a land use plan so devised will reflect rather the informed
judgment of the chosen expert than a judicial application of settled principle
to particular facts. Full realization of
this is likely further to diminish the
39
probability of community acceptance.

And later he noted that judicial zoning "not only exceed[s] the boundaries of judicial skill but also those of 'political tolerance.' . .. Such
activity 'cuts too closely to the political core of our society.' "40
No one questions that zoning is a legislative function. When the judiciary-for whatever reason-undertakes to move in this field, it immediately
places in issue its power of legitimacy. I suggest that such intrusion may be
especially resented, and hence more likely to be denied acceptance, where the
subject matter is as controversial and potentially inflammatory as are many
questions of zoning. How much better were
the Legislature to take steps that
41
would obviate this problem altogether!
There is no real likelihood that any of the problems to which I have adverted will yield to unaided judicial ingenuity. There is, on the other hand,
very legitimate hope that our zoning difficulties and land use problems--centered as they are today around the injustice of exclusionary zoning, but by no
means limited to that- can be ameliorated and eventually solved by careful
and imaginative legislative action. The Legislature can recruit the expertise,
hear all sides of each strand of the tangled web, view the State regionally or as
a whole, experiment if need be, and develop a land use program responsive to
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id at 626, 371 A.2d at 1265.
Id.
Id at 628, 311 A.2d at 1266.
Id-at 628-29, 371 A.2d at 1266.
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the needs of all its citizens. I am satisfied this a feat of which the courts are
incapable. 4 2

In the end, Justice Mountain was so troubled with the course of the
law, that his only agreement with the majority was that the case
should be remanded. Sharply disagreeing with essentially all the
terms of that remand, he argued that since the court was setting new
standards for the resolution of these exclusionary zoning cases, the
municipality should be given not only the right to further argument in
the court below but a chance to present additional evidence. In addition, Mountain disagreed with all the remedies prescribed by the majority opinion including the builder's remedy and the order to rezone.
IV. MOUNT LAUREL II
A climax to the first phase of the New Jersey's consideration of the
exclusionary zoning problem was reached in 1983 in Mount Laurel
11.43 That case was an appeal by plaintiffs and defendant from the
decision of the trial court reached on remand of Mount Laurel I, in
which it was held that: (1) the rezoning done by the town in response
to the supreme court's original mandate was a bona fide attempt to
comply with its requirements; and (2) that a developer-intervenor was
entitled to a builder's remedy for a mobile home court. The town had
rezoned twenty out of 14,700 acres for lower income housing, most of
which was arguably unsuitable for housing at all.
It had been apparent to the New Jersey Supreme Court, in considering the entire matter, that the mandates of Mount Laurel I, directing the towns of the state to solve the exclusionary zoning
problem, were being met by universal municipal inaction and fierce
political opposition. In Mount Laurel II the court had an opportunity
to beat a strategic retreat from its earlier positions, but it chose instead
to forge ahead in one of the most aggressive exercises in judicial law
making ever attempted by a state court. In a 155 page opinion by
Chief Justice Wilentz, the court strongly affirmed the constitutional
rights invented in the earlier case and put new, sharp teeth into the
remedies prescribed to enforce them. The emotional flavor of the
opinion will be best appreciated by reading of some of its most indignant and strident language:
This is the return, eight years later, of Southern Burlington County
N.AA.CP. v. Township of Mount Laurel, (Mount LaurelI). We set forth in
that case, for the first time, the doctrine requiring that municipalities' land
use regulations provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income
housing. The doctrine has become famous. The Mount Laurel case itself
threatens to become infamous. After all this time, ten years after the trial
42. Id- at 630, 371 A.2d at 1267.
43. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (1983).
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court's initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains
afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies,
rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but
Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not
alone; we believe that there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case.
To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it to continue. This Court is
more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel doctrine than ever, and
we are determined, within appropriate judicial bounds, to make it work. The
obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation. We
have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is
used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses,
trials and appeals. We intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and
make it easier for public officials, including judges, to apply it.
This case is accompanied by five others, heard together and decided in this
opinion. All involve questions arising from the Mount Laurel doctrine. They
demonstrate the need to put some steel into that doctrine. The deficiencies in
its application range from uncertainty and inconsistency at the trial level to
inflexible review criteria at the appellate level. The waste of judicial energy
involved at every level is substantial and is matched only by the often needless
expenditure of talent on the part of lawyers and experts. The length and complexity of trials is often outrageous, and the expense of litigation is so high
that a real question develops whether the municipality can afford to defend or
the plaintiffs can afford to sue.4 4

Thus, rather than drawing the conclusion that the complained of
inefficacy of and opposition to Mount LaurelI was the fault of a judiciary that had tried to extend its power too far, the court, frustrated
with the pace of the reforms it had ordered, concluded that even harsher measures were required. It thereupon proceeded to promulgate a
comprehensive system of substantive and procedural rules to govern
the disposition of all Mount Laurel disputes. A summary of the more
important holdings of the case will indicate the tremendous sweep of
the opinion:
(1) "Every municipality's land use regulations should provide a
realistic opportunity for decent housing for at least some part of its
resident poor who now occupy dilapidated housing.., except where
they represent a disproportionately large segment of the population as
compared with the rest of the region." 45 The exception would pertain
to many of the urban areas of the state.
(2) The municipal obligation will no longer extend only to "developing communities" but will apply to every town in the state designated as a "growth area" in the State Development Guide Plan, a plan
prepared by the Division of State and Regional Planning in the executive branch of state government. 46
(3) The municipality must provide opportunity for its defined fair
44. Id at 198-200, 456 A.2d at 409-11 (citations omitted).
45. Id at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
46. Id at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.
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share of low and moderate income housing.47
(4) To get fairly uniform results, future Mount Laurel litigation
will be assigned to three judges, each to a region of the state.48
(5) "The municipal obligation to provide a realistic opportunity
for the construction of its fair share of low and moderate income housing may require more than the elimination of unnecessary cost-producing requirements and restrictions. Affirmative governmental
devices should be used to make the opportunity realistic, including
lower-income density bonuses and mandatory set-asides. Furthermore the municipality should cooperate with the developer's attempts
to obtain federal subsidies."49
(6) "The lower income regional housing need is comprised of both
low and moderate income housing. A municipality's fair share should
include both in such proportion as reflects consideration of all relevant factors, including the proportion of low and moderate income
housing that make up the regional need."50
(7) "Least cost housing" is not an adequate substitute for low and
moderate income housing and should be used when all the other above
remedies have been considered and tried.51
(8) Ordinarily a builder's remedy will be granted to a successful
plaintiff in Mount Laurel litigation "provided that the proposed project includes an appropriate portion of low and moderate income housing, and provided further that it is located and designed in accordance
with sound zoning and planning concepts, including its environmental
impact."52
(9) To avoid the problem of multiple trials, appeals, and remands,
cases should ordinarily be handled with one trial and one appeal. This
means that a town whose zoning ordinance has been declared unconstitutional might be required to rezone before it even has the chance
to appeal.53
(10) Courts have the power (to be used sparingly) to phase in relief gradually to avoid too radical a change in the nature of the
municipality.54
In reviewing the entire Mount Laurel II opinion, one is struck by
the hubris of its tone as well as the overarching comprehensiveness of
its coverage. It was almost as if the court was saying that if the legislature doesn't want to solve this problem with a comprehensive legisla47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 215-16, 456 A.2d at 418-19.
Id at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
Id. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419.

I&
Id. at 217-18, 456 A.2d at 419-20.
Id. at 218, 456 A.2d at 420.
IdId. at 218-19, 456 A.2d at 420.
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tive program using the normal statutory tools at its command, the
court will legislate for it, promulgating a complete and comprehensive
statute-like program for reform of the system using the tools at its
command, judicial ipse dixit.
V.

POLITICAL AND LEGISLATIVE REACTION
TO MOUNT LAUREL II

A.

The Fair Housing Act of 1985

The political reaction to Mount Laurel II was predictably hostile.
As one commentator described it:
It is difficult to convey adequately the intensity of the public reaction to
the Mount Laurel process since 1983. Where Mount LaurelI could be ignored
because it was ineffective, Mount Laurel II worked and it stirred up a
firestorm. Perhaps the best-known political contribution was by the Governor
of New Jersey, who equated Mount Laurel with communism; a local mayor
flamboyantly promised to go to jail rather than obey a Mount Laurel judgment. Politicians in suburban communities simply had to oppose Mount Laurel as a political matter, and it was a rare local official who could be induced to
discuss settlement of litigation. Ironically, the effect was to drive the process
ever more firmly into the courts and the litigation process, frustrating the
'voluntary' compliance the state supreme court hoped for.5 5

Though the initial reaction in the New Jersey Senate to Mount
Laurel 1I was the introduction of an angry resolution to overturn the
Mount Laurel decisions by constitutional amendment, this never
passed and cooler heads prevailed a few years later with the passage of
the Fair Housing Act of 1985.5 It is testimony to America's long and
deeply-engrained reverence for judicial rulings on constitutional questions that the compromise statute passed at all, because there was very
widespread sentiment in the state that the decisions of the court had
gone much too far in extending judicial power beyond its historic limits and that the decisions therefore should be unconditionally opposed.
A brief summary of the Act will be sufficient to indicate its scope
and effect. The statute created a new state administrative agency
called the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to administer the
Act. COAH was charged with the determination of: (1) the boundaries of the various housing regions in the state; (2) the need for housing in each of the regions; (3) the fair share of those needs assigned to
each municipality in the state; and (4) estimated future population and
household size for the regions. 57
Municipalities might but were not required to submit to COAH
their own fair share plan and "housing element."58 The housing ele55. Payne, Rethinking FairShare: The JudicialEnforcement of Affordable Housing
Policies,16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 22 (1987).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986).
57. Id. at § 52:27D-307 (West 1986).
58. Id. at § 52:27D-309 (West 1986).
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ment had to contain at least the following matters concerning the
town in question: (1) a detailed inventory of existing housing, (2) a
future projection of the town's housing stock for the next six years; (3)
a detailed demographic analysis; (4) an analysis of present and future
employment; (5) a determination of the town's present and future fair
share of lower income housing; and (6) an analysis of suitable land for
59
lower income housing.
COAH could grant a town, upon its application, "substantive certification" of its housing element and zoning ordinances upon a finding
that its fair share plan was acceptable and that there were no "unnecessary housing cost-generating" features in its land use ordinances and
that "affirmative measures in the housing element . . .make the
achievement of the municipality's fair share of low and moderate income housing realistically possible .... ,"60 If a town received the substantive certification, it had the benefit of a "presumption of validity
attaching to the housing element and ordinances implementing" it.61
A person thereafter challenging them had "the burden of proof to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [said element and
ordinances] ... do not provide a realistic opportunity for the provision
62
of the municipality's fair share" of lower income housing.
The statute contained a provision authorizing "regional contribution agreements" wherein a town in the same region as a central city
could meet up to one half of its fair share by agreeing with that city to
finance lower income housing therein 6 3 Once approved by COAH
such an agreement was given a presumption of validity.64 The statute
further provided: "To rebut the presumption of validity, the complainant shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the agreement does not provide for a realistic
opportunity for the provision of low and moderate income housing
65
within the housing region."
The Act contained a provision allowing the courts to order, under
statutorily defined timetables, a slow phase-in of municipal action to
meet the fair share obligation. 66 In addition, the Act empowered the
state Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency to administer rent controls, resale price controls, and eligibility lists for purchasers and rent67
ers in connection with various kinds of inclusionary developments.
Under the statute: "Any municipality which.., reached a settlement
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

I& at § 52:27D-310 (West 1986).
Id. at § 52:27D-314b (West 1986).
Id. at § 52:27D-317a (West 1986).

I&
Id at § 52:27D-312 (West 1986).
Id. at § 52:27D-317b (West 1986).

65. Id.
66. Id- at § 52:27D-323 (West 1986).
67. Id- at § 52:27D-324 (West 1986).
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of any exclusionary zoning litigation prior to the effective date of [the]
act, [would] not be subject to any exclusionary zoning suit for a six
year period ... ."68 Further, a municipality might seek a six year period of repose in a declaratory judgment action filed in superior court
69
after it filed its housing element.
Perhaps the most important effect of the Act was to get the supervision of land use law out of the courts and into the Council on Affordable Housing. Under the statute:
For those exclusionary zoning cases instituted more than 60 days before the
effective date of this act, any party to the litigation may file a motion with the
court to seek a transfer of the case to the council. In determining whether or
transfer would
not to transfer, the court shall consider whether or not the
70
result in a manifest injustice to any party to the litigation.

And for those cases begun after, or within 60 days before, the effective
date of the Act, there was a provision for mediation by the Council,
which if unsuccessful, would be followed by a determination by an administrative law judge. 71 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards72 interpreted these provisions
as requiring COAH to initiate proceedings for "substantive certification," and held that the courts "would have nothing more to do with
the determination and satisfaction of the Mount Laurel obligation unless and until either a challenge was subsequently made to that substantive certification, or such certification was denied." 73 Thus as the
court interpreted the statute, it foresaw that, essentially, Mount Laurel disputes would be taken from the courts and handled by an administrative agency.
The court also considered the constitutionality of the Fair Housing
Act in the same case.74 Suit had been brought by various developers
and public interest groups who were dissatisfied with the decision by
the legislature to shift basic control of exclusionary zoning disputes
from the judiciary to an administrative agency. In a brief opinion, the
court upheld the constitutionality of the Act against challenges that it:
(1) would improperly delay implementation of the solution to the
Mount Laurel problem; (2) unconstitutionally limited judicial power
by curtailing the right to review ordinances by certiorari and by imposing a temporary moratorium on the builder's remedy; and (3)
would not result in construction of low income housing. As to the last
point the court simply said: ".

.

. before this Act may be declared un-

constitutional on these grounds, the contention that it will not work
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id- at § 52:27D-322 (West 1986).
Id, at § 52:27D-313 (West 1986).
Id- at § 52:27D-316 (West 1986).
Id at § 52:27D-315 (West 1986).
103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
Id at 38, 510 A.2d at 641.
Id
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must be close to a certainty."75
B.

Preliminary Results Under the Fair Housing Act

In 1986, COAH, which had been established by the Fair Housing
Act, promulgated guidelines: (1) defining the six housing regions in
the state; (2) setting allocation formulas for determining the lower income housing needs in each region; (3) stating the housing obligations
of each region and municipality; and (4) establishing a procedure for
certification of a municipal housing element. In 1987 and 1988, a survey of some eighty municipalities was made by Martha Lamar and Associates for the Fund for New Jersey and the Alliance for Affordable
Housing, to find out how the Fair Housing Act was functioning in
practice. 76 The fifty-four municipalities which responded were among
the most active "in planning and producing low- and moderate-income
77
housing in the State."
The details of survey findings will not be fully rehearsed here, but
there are some important trends that should be mentioned. First, it is
not surprising to note that with the decrease in funds appropriated by
Congress to federal housing programs in the 1980s, only a small proportion of affordable housing construction was of the subsidized housing variety. Thus, of the 2830 affordable units completed at the time of
the survey, 2101, or 74%, were in mandatory set-aside developments
while the balance were constructed through "other methods."78 By
"other methods" is meant rehabilitation of existing units and construction of new, federally and municipally subsidized, housing
projects. 79 And, interestingly, of the 2257 affordable units under construction at the time of the survey, 2123, or 94%, were in mandatory
set-aside developments while only 6% were through "other methods."8 0 Set-asides were also 92% of the units with preliminary municipal approvals1 and 80% of those proposed but not yet approved.8 2 In
set-asides 86% of the units were for sale and 14% were for rent, while
in "other methods" 47% of the units were for sale and 53% were for
rent.83
Thus, COAH has used the mandatory set-aside as the predominant
75. 1& at 43, 510 A.2d at 643.
76. M. LAMAR AND AsSOCiATEs, AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEw JERSEY: THE RESULTS
OF MoUNT LAUREL II AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACr (1988) [hereinafter AFFORDABLE HOUsING].
77. It was estimated that these towns had 93% of the total number of affordable
housing units completed in compliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine. Id at 9.
78. Id at 15.
79. Id- at 12.
80. Idc. at 26.
81. Id at 27.
82. Id at 29.
83. Id. at 19.
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means of carrying out the mandate of Mount Laurel II. As noted
above, under the mandatory set-aside, a developer seeking approval to
build profit-making housing must earmark some percentage (conventionally twenty percent) of his projected units to lower income housing. These units must then be sold or rented at below market prices.8 4
In exchange for his undertaking to construct the lower income housing, the city typically gives the developer a "density bonus" which is
intended to compensate the builder for at least some of the losses he
necessarily incurs by selling or renting the units at below market
prices. The density bonus allows the builder to build more units per
acre than he ordinarily would be allowed to under the relevant zoning
ordinance. Also necessarily accompanying these devices are resale
price controls which have two purposes: to prevent the first occupant
of the affordable housing from getting a windfall in a quick resale, and
to maintain the housing for lower income persons.
VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE MANDATORY SET-ASIDE AND
DENSITY BONUS

The use of the mandatory set-aside rather than some of the other
possible devices is partially explainable by the obvious fact that the
former does not cost municipalities one red cent of tax money. When
a town is pressured by state authorities to do something in the way of a
lower income housing program, there is often political support by existing town residents for use of the set-aside and corresponding political opposition to the use of other devices that cost local tax money,
such as municipal housing subsidy programs.
That is not to say that there may not be political opposition to public housing projects where the money comes from the federal government. Thus in the famous Yonkers, New York case, when, because of
a past history of municipally encouraged racial segregation, the U.S.
District Court ordered the city to build scatter-site public housing
outside the traditionally minority areas using federal funds,85 there
was still tremendous opposition from residents of the affected areas.
84. The affordable units built for sale have been predominantly in townhouse and
multiplex (up to 24-plex) developments. Id. at 58-59. The Mount Laurel units
typically are smaller than the market rate units. Id. at 60. They are priced not on
the basis of what they cost to construct, but rather on what lower and moderate
income persons can afford to pay per month in the way of mortgage, taxes, and
insurance. Id. at 39-53.
The Mount Laurel requirement is expected to change the mix of new housing
construction in the state from around 30% multifamily (including townhouses)
and 70% single family, to around 40% multifamily and 60% single family. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § 10, at 9.
85. U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), qff'd-, 837 F.2d
1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
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One could infer that this opposition was based at least partly upon
racial and/or class prejudice.
Obviously, there are substantial costs involved in using the
mandatory set-aside. After all, the units are marketed at less than
their fair market value and indeed at less than the total expenses incurred in their production. The density bonuses offered to compensate the builder for these costs are often not adequate to cover them
totally, and the difference between the two amounts must be borne by
someone.8 6 The likely loss-bearers, absent government subsidy, are
the builder, the consumer of the regularly priced housing offered by
the builder, and the landowners whose properties are being developed.
Professor Ellickson has argued that the inclusionary costs are
borne by the owners of the undeveloped land in towns where the demand for the housing is elastic. 8 7 That occurs when there are perfect
substitutes for housing in other neighboring towns not having those
costs. The argument is that to keep prospective buyers from going to
those other lower cost towns, the builder would have to price the new
profit-making units to meet the competition. He would then seek to
make up the difference by offering to pay less for developable land.
On the other hand, where demand for housing in the municipality
is inelastic, that is, where the town has unique advantages in facility or
location that other neighboring towns do not offer, the losses inflicted
by the set-aside would be borne both by owners of undeveloped land
and consumers of the new regularly priced housing.8 8 This is so because some consumers would be willing to pay more than they would
for similar housing in neighboring towns. But these consumers would
not bear the entire loss, because the price increase they paid would be
less than the total cost of the inclusionary measure, and some of the
costs would be passed back to the owners of developable land.
Speaking still of the town that has unique attributes, at the same
time as the consumers and landowners would bear the costs of the
new lower income housing, other economic groups would be receiving
fortuitous gains. Obviously a few lower income families receiving the
subsidized housing would reap the largest benefits. However, owners
of existing housing in the community would also benefit, because
86. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1181. There is evidence that some density bonuses
offer the builder sufficient compensation so that the incentive to build is not destroyed. Of course, all this might mean is that the builder is able to pass the
increased costs on to someone else. See infra discussion accompanying notes 15863.
87. Id. at 1190. For a similar analysis, see Delaney & Smith, Development Exactions:
Winners and Losers, 17 REAL EST. L. J. 195, 209-11 (1989). See also Fischel, The
Economics of Land Use Exactions:A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1987); Nicholas, Impact Exactions:Economic Theory, Practice
and Incidence, 50 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoBs. 85 (1987).
88. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1190-91.
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fewer new housing units would be produced as the price of new housing rose, and therefore the used housing would face less competition
and its price would also rise. On the other hand, the larger number of
the lower income families would not receive the subsidy and they
would be harmed by having to pay higher prices for housing than they
ordinarily would; they, therefore, would end up as net losers often unable to buy housing in the town at all. Overall, then, it appears that
inclusionary devices such as the mandatory set-aside really have exclusionary effects on the vast majority of those sought to be helped, at
least in those towns where the demand for the housing is inelastic.
Other arguments can be made against the mandatory set-aside as
well. If dwellings were sold to individuals at below-market prices in
such a way that they were free to resell the unit at market, they would
get an undeserved windfall gain and the unit would no longer be available to lower income families. Thus the set-aside has of necessity always been accompanied by resale controls. The typical resale control
allows the owner to recoup the original cost, plus cost of improvements, plus an increase represented by the percentage which the Consumer Price Index or other inflation measure has grown since
purchase.89 Any time the law attempts to frustrate the allocations
that would be made by trading at market price, distortions and inefficiencies can arise, and that is certainly the case here. As William
Tucker has pointed out about housing with resale controls:
[Tihe new housing will not circulate. The new owners, after all, are subsidized and cannot move without giving up their subsidy. They are usually not
even allowed to sell their unit without giving up a significant portion of the
capital appreciation, either to the municipality or the next owner. Thus, they
will stay in their units long after the units have ceased to suit them and long
after they have ceased to be 'low income.' By attaching subsidies to housing
units, rather than the people who live in them, governments effectively take
these units off the market. 90

Other inefficiencies and inequities are introduced as well. The
owner of the property, faced with a price cap, does not have the normal incentives to maintain the premises properly. 91 And since distri89. See, e.g., the resale controls (called affordability controls) described in AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 76, at 35.1, A.3.

90. W. TUCKER, THE EXCLUDED AMERICANS: HOMELEssNESs AND HOUSING POLICIES
126 (1990).
91. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1179 n.62 quoting Willam A. Fischel as follows:
[R]esale controls discourage everyday maintenance such as painting and
cleaning. At first I thought that this would be [deterred] by the price
index, but let me give an example to show why it is not so. If the market
price of a unit is $100,000, and the controlled price is $60,000, assume that
all housing prices rise in five years by 50%. The controlled house now
can be sold for $90,000, for a tidy tax free gain of $30,000. But why should
the lucky 'moderate income' family settle for only a $30,000 gain? Suppose that ordinary maintenance in the five year period would have cost
$50,000. Foregoing the maintenance causes the house to depreciate by
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bution of a very limited resource is made at an artificially low price,
allocation to the "wrong" (i.e., non lower income) persons through
corruption, prejudice, or favoritism is an ever-present threat.
What follows from all this legally? Assuming that the above analysis is correct and that the attempt to supply new housing for lower
income persons through mandatory set-asides is often self-defeating or
does more harm than good, is the device subject to constitutional attack as a violation of substantive due process or as a taking? As a practical matter asking the question as a matter of state law in a state like
New Jersey would seem to be rather quixotic, because the court in
that state has not only held that the device is not unconstitutional, but
92
indeed its use may actually be required by the state constitution.
However, that still does not answer the question as a matter of federal
constitutional law.
A.

Takings Analysis-Nollan and the Means-Ends Review

To analyze the validity of the mandatory set-aside, one must start
with the U.S. Supreme Court case of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,93 in which the Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia established as a bedrock takings principle what had not until very recently been a takings principle at all-a constitutional requirement of
a nexus between means and ends. In that case, the Nollans sought a
permit to tear down their small beachfront dwelling and replace it
with a modern larger home. The Nollan property lay between two
public beaches. The California Coastal Commission agreed to grant a
permit, if the Nollans gave the public an easement to pass across their
beach from one abutting public beach to the other. The easement was
to be along the shoreline between the mean high tide line and the
seawall protecting the Nollan's property. The justification for the condition advanced by the Commission was that the new house would increase blockage of the public's view of the ocean. The Court held that
the easement requirement constituted a taking of the Nollan's property. In support of that ruling it said that a "land-use regulation does
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
$10,000. But what does the controlled price owner care? All that happens to him is that the 'true' value of the house is now only $140,000
($150,000 minus $10,000). But since he cannot get more than $90,000, he
has no incentive to maintain the house. In fact, in this situation he has
some incentive to cannibalize the house, selling some good features and
replacing them with cheap (or no) features.
92. In a recent case, the New Jersey Supreme Court has implied that it will hold,
when presented with the issue, that mandatory set-asides are not takings even if
not accompanied by compensation. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
93. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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land.' "94 And conversely "'[a] use restriction may constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose.' "95 The Court felt that the condition did not advance the Commission's objective of protecting the public's view of the
ocean since it is "quite impossible to understand how a requirement
that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created
by the new house."9 6 Therefore, since there was no nexus between
the condition attempted to be imposed and the end advanced as justification for it, the condition was an unconstitutional taking.
The Nollan test-requiring the linkage of the exaction with the
objective advanced in justification of it-serves the important function
of demanding that governmental impingements on private property
not be used as a subterfuge to extract from the individual some valuable right which the government could not ordinarily take without paying compensation for it, just because the individual happens to be
seeking some permission from the government at the time. To avoid a
taking by subterfuge, there must be a relation between the government's condition and that particular objective which it advances to justify the condition.97 If the regulation does not meet that threshold
test, it is improper. Why should the government harm a person in the
exercise of his property rights when its purported justification for doing so is a sham designed to take his property without paying for it?98
The Nollan opinion was a departure from established prior law in
at least two respects. First, it established with finality that a meanends judicial review was an appropriate test to be used to determine
whether a particular regulation was a taking, although it conceded
such a review was also appropriate under the due process clause. Second, and more importantly, it differentiated between those two kinds
of means-ends reviews in seemingly attaching a standard of heightened judicial scrutiny to one under the takings clause.
Since the time of the New Deal, the Court had evolved a threetiered structure for review of legislation under the equal protection
clause and the substantive component of the due process clause. With
94. Id-at 834.
95. IM
96. Id- at 838.
97.

As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgement of
property rights through the police power as a "substantialadvanc[ing]"

of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful
about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a
condition to the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context
there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power objective.

Id at 841 (emphasis in original).
98. On this point of takings by subterfuge, see also Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88

COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1611-12 (1988).
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respect to economic and social legislation, the Court used a rational
basis test, which in effect gave almost untrammeled power to the various legislatures to regulate as they saw fit. Under that approach, as a
matter of due process, the challenged law merely had to rationally relate to some legitimate government objective to be upheld by the
Court.99 Furthermore, in the absence of some articulated purpose for
the law, the Court made clear that, in order to uphold a law, it would
hypothesize any possible legitimate purpose the legislature might
have had as a justification for it.100 And, in Ferguson v. Skrupa,101 the
Court seemingly went even further in abandoning substantive due
process review of economic legislation when it said: "[We] refuse to sit
as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation'.... Whether
the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer,
Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours." 102
On the other hand, in reviewing the wisdom of laws affecting "fundamental" civil rights and civil liberties, the Court leaned in the other
direction, developing a formula requiring "strict scrutiny" of the legislation. "Where the government seeks to deprive persons of fundamental rights, it must prove to the Court that the law is necessary to
promote a compelling or overriding [state] interest."os A listing of
those rights the Court came to view as "fundamental", and, therefore,
deserving of protection by strict scrutiny included
most guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the right to fairness in the criminal
process, the right to privacy (including some freedom of choice in matters of
marriage, sexual relations and child bearing), the right to travel, the right to
vote, the freedom of association and some aspects of fairness in the adjudication of 1individual
claims against the government (procedural due process
rights). 0 4

Since the 1930s, as a practical matter, when the Court has used the
rational basis form of judicial review, it has become extremely difficult to induce it to set aside a government regulation. On the other
hand, when the Court has used the strict scrutiny-compelling interest
review, it has become very difficult to get it to uphold the regulation.
In yet a third group of the cases, (involving the equal protection
clause), the Court developed an intermediate standard of heightened
scrutiny in which it seemed independently to examine the classification for its rationality. Thus, in sex discrimination cases, the Court
required that the classification be "substantially related" to an "im1 05
portant governmental objective."'
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id- at 490.
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
IH at 731-32.
J. NOWAx, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW 448 (2d ed. 1983).
IdCraig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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It was Justice Scalia's use of the language of intermediate heightened scrutiny, in connection with a takings analysis (rather than in
connection with equal protection where it originated), that marks the
importance of the Nollan case.
Contrary to Justice Brennan's claim .... our opinions do not establish that
these [takings] standards are the same as those applied to due process or
equal-protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have been quite different. We have required that the regulation
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved,
[the takings formulation], not that 'the State "could rationallyhave decided"
the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective' [the due process formulation] .... [Tihere is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases
gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at
issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal
protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any reason to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards for due
protection challenges, and First Amendment chalprocess challenges, equal
10 6
lenges are identical.

In support of the above takings-due process distinction, Justice
Scalia cited two earlier cases, Agins v. Tiburon' 0 7 and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.108 Agins in turn relied upon
Nectow v. Cambridge 0 9 for its assertion that it is a taking if the challenged land use law does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. But that is not quite what the latter case held. The Nectow
court did not rest the rule upon the takings clause but rather upon the
due process clause of the Constitution. That is hardly surprising because the means-to-a-lawful-end inquiry was at the time of Nectow the
standard formulation of the traditional substantive due process review. One would have to assume that Justice Scalia was being quite
disingenuous in implying that the rule he established in Nollan was
not a departure from prior law, for the means-end review was certainly not a traditional part of the takings jurisprudence of the last
century. 110 As mentioned above, if one takes literally and gives full
106. 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987).
Also noteworthy on the nexus issue is the New York Court of Appeals opinion
in Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 554 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 N.E.2d
1059 (1989). In that case the court held, unconstitutional as a taking, a municipal
law that (1) established a five year moratorium on the conversion, alteration, and
demolition of single-room occupancy housing;, (2) required owners to restore the
units to habitable condition; and (3) required the owners to rent the dwellings at
rent controlled rents. One of the grounds that the court gave was that, following
the rule of the Nollan case, there was not a sufficient nexus between the regulation and the aim of housing the homeless.
107. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
108. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
109. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
110. Takings law had previously emphasized whether the governmental activity involved a physical invasion (taking), or was the regulation of a noxious use (not
taking), or whether it resulted in too great a diminution in value (taking). See
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scope to what the justice says, the Nollan case makes a remarkable

change in the law. With his use of the words "substantially advance a
legitimate state interest" he is announcing for land use regulations a
takings rule of heightened means-end scrutiny similar to that applied
to sex 1 1 and illegitimacyll 2 discrimination under the equal protection
clause.
In dissenting, Justice Brennan challenged Justice Scalia's use of a
takings formulation to justify making a heightened-scrutiny, meansends review of land use control regulations. Brennan argued that the
judicial determination of the rationality of a regulation was a substantive due process and not a takings question at all. He pooh-poohed
Scalia's careful distinction between the various verbal formulations
that had been used in the past to describe exactly what the rationality
review was to be.
Our phraseology may differ slightly from case to case-e.g., regulation
must 'substantially advance,' or be 'reasonably necessary to' the government's
end. These minor differences cannot, however, obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.
Of course, government action may be a valid exercise of the police power
and still violate specific provisions of the Constitution. Justice Scalia is certainly correct in observing that challenges founded upon these provisions are
reviewed under different standards .... Our consideration of factors such as
those identified in Penn Central, supra, for instance, provides an analytical
framework for protecting the values underlying the Takings Clause, and other
distinctive approaches are utilized to give effect to other constitutional provisions. This is far different, however, from the use of different standards of
review to address the threshold issue of the rationality of government
11 3
action.

For Justice Brennan, then, the proper means-end review of land
use regulations was under the doctrines of substantive due process and
equal protection, using the most forgiving rational basis formula as the
standard of review. The quarrel between the majority's and the dissent's view of whether the takings or due process clause is the appropriate one to use is not terribly important. What is important,
however, is their differences with respect to what the standard of review should be. Nollan established that a meaningful, heightened,
nexus scrutiny of governmental regulation of property rights is,
henceforth the governing norm.
What would result from the application of Justice Scalia's nexus
doctrine in the Nollan case to the mandatory set-aside device ordered
by the Mount Laurel cases? It is clear that the desired objective of
the regulation is to get more housing built for the poor in locations
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 170-77
(1974).
111. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977).
112. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
113. 483 U.S. 825, 844 n.1 (1987)(citations omitted).
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where they are not already concentrated. The question then would be
whether requiring that builders set aside loss-priced housing for sale
to lower income persons, as a condition for obtaining a permit to build
profit-making housing, "substantially advances the legitimate state interest" in reaching that objective. If the requirement does not get the
poor so dispersed, then it would certainly violate the policy against
taking by subterfuge, which is the bedrock principle underlying the
Nollan case, for it is absolutely clear that the government would have
no right to pass a law requiring builders to build housing for the poor
at a loss, if at the same time the builder were not seeking a permit to
build profitable housing.
If one were to accord some presumption of validity to the legislative, judicial, or administrative decision to use the device, there is at
least a surface plausibility to the argument that the means are calculated to reach the end. The above economic analysis, 1 14 however, suggests that the attempt may be self-defeating and counterproductive, as
it might actually have substantially exclusionary effects. Should the
federal courts use economic analysis to reach the conclusion that the
state administrators are wrong in saying that the means are calculated
to achieve the end? This is a close question, the answer to which probably depends upon who has the burden of proof to show nexus or lack
of nexus. The Nollan opinion is not clear on that point, but the notion
of heightened scrutiny contained in the requirement that the regulation "substantially advance legitimate state interests" certainly would
appear to cast the burden on the person asserting that the regulation
is not a taking. For that reason, one could argue that an uncompensated mandate that builders sell some of their property at a loss to
lower income persons with the objective of providing more affordable
housing for them constitutes a taking. On the other side, it could be
argued that for almost every analysis by a qualified economist on a
particular issue, one can find an analysis on the other side by an economist just as qualified,115 and that economics as a discipline simply does
not have the degree of certitude that should be required to serve as a
basis for substituting the judgment of the courts for that of state governmental authorities. The answer to the issue really depends upon
whether the courts begin to review deprivations of property with as
critical an eye as they have reviewed allegations of deprivations of civil
rights.
A clue to the answer to that question may come from the New
York Court of Appeals. In a recent case, Seawall Associates v. City of
New York,11 6 the court held unconstitutional as a taking, a municipal
law that (1) established a five year moratorium on the conversion, al114. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
115. See Kleven, supra note 14, at 1473-90.
116. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 554 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (1989).
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teration, and demolition of single-room occupancy (SRO) housing;, (2)
required owners to restore the units to habitable condition; and (3)
required the owners to rent the dwellings at rent controlled rents.
The city advanced as the objective of the law, the housing of the homeless. One of the grounds that the court gave for its holding that it was
a taking, among others, was that, following the rule of the Nollan case,
there was not a sufficient nexus between the regulation and the aim of
housing the homeless. In reviewing this question the court rejected
the city's contention that by increasing the availability of SRO housing, this would help to achieve that end. Using the city's own study
that indicated a ban on destroying these units would not do much to
help the homeless, the court also made its own evaluation of this question and said "there is simply no assurance that units will be rented to
members of either [homeless] group ....While, of course, any increase
in the supply of low-cost housing would benefit some prospective tenants, it is by no means clear that it would actually benefit the homeless."117 In Seawall Associates, the New York court certainly gave the
heightened scrutiny called for by the Nollan case in its review of the
supposed nexus between means and ends.
A federal court with a similarly critical eye could well reach the
same result in reviewing mandatory set-asides under Mount Laurel
and for a much more convincing reason. In Seawall Associates, the
court was talking about theory-what was likely to happen if the SRO
law were enforced. But in the case of mandatory set-asides, we have
more than theory- we have actual results to examine. It has been
observed for quite some time that the "wrong persons"-that is people
who are neither poor nor minority-are getting the benefit of affordable housing built under mandatory set-aside programs.1' 8 Under the
Mount Laurel programs already constructed, the tendency is to give
priority to persons who have some connection with the town such as
residents of the town, persons employed in the town or by the town,
and relatives of town residents.11 9 Lotteries are also used in some of
the subdivisions usually after the persons having a priority have been
taken care of.120 As William Tucker in his recent book The Excluded
Americans notes concerning these Mount Laurel units:
Much to the consternation of housing advocates (and the quiet relief of
suburban officials), these units have not fallen into the hands of the urban
117. Id. at 111-12, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 551, 542 N.E.2d.
118. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1178, where the author noted that "[tihe beneficiaries of inclusionary programs apparently include disproportionate numbers of
both upwardly mobile young families and divorced women with children," and

that "there can be no doubt that the great majority of the California families who
have received inclusionary units have had income in the middle third of the
state's income distribution." I& at 1193.
119. AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 76, at 38.
120. I- at 37.1 and 37.2.
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poor. Instead they have attracted what might be called 'subsidy hunters'young couples, divorced single mothers, the elderly, and other middle-class
people who are knowledgeable enough to take advantage of the system. In
1988, The New York Times reported: '[T]he first trickle of affordable homes
built [under Mount Laurel] has not gone to the inner-city poor, even though
the court held in 1975... that the poor in cities were entitled under the State
constitution to the same housing opportunities in the suburbs as other economic classes .... With their meager incomes and weak credit ratings, [the
poor] either cannot qualify for or afford a down-payment or closing costs, experts on the Mt. Laurel doctrine say.
'Instead, the homes, generally priced between $30,000 and 70,000, have
been snapped up by others who qualify as low- and moderate-income buyers,
most notably young professional families and divorced, single, and retired
people. '" 2 1

It should also be noted that the specially prepared empirical study
of the results of the Mount Laurel cases indicates that minority occupancy of these units has been negligible.122 Therefore, opponents of
mandatory set-asides can not only point to economic theory but to actual results to show that without compensation, there is a taking because there is no nexus between the means-the set-aside-and the
ends--dispersion of the urban poor into various communities around
the state. Mandatory set-asides of affordable housing in middle income
developments should not survive such a means-ends scrutiny.
B.

Subdivision Exactions-Nexus Between the Proposed Activity and the
Public Need

In its opinion in Nollan, the Court also dealt with but dismissed the
government's argument that the regulation passed another nexus test,
the one traditionally used by state courts to determine the validity of
subdivision exactions. Under various versions of that test, more fully
described below, an exaction, required by local government of a subdividing developer, is invalid as a taking unless it can be shown that the
developer's proposed new use in some way created a public need that
the exaction is serving to fulfill. In the context of the Nollan case, one
would have to show that the larger house sought by the Nollans would
create an additional burden upon or need for public view that in turn
justified the proposed easement condition.
The above rules as to subdivision exactions have direct relevance to
the issue we are considering in this Article, for the reason that the
predominant remedy under Mount Laurel has become the mandatory
121. W. TUCKER, supra note 90, at 125 (quoting an article by Robert Hanley in the N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1988).
122. The report says: "Many developments have very small minority populations and,
within that minority population, even smaller numbers of black residents. At
least three Mount Laurel developments appear to have no black residents; in
some other developments the percentage of black homebuyers varies from 1% to
3%." AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 76, at 69.
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set-aside, itself a form of subdivision exaction. As noted earlier, the
mandatory set-aside is designed to bring lower income persons into
market-priced developments by exacting from the developer a requirement that he sell some units below cost to qualified lower income
buyers (generally in return for allowing the developer some increased
density in the subdivision.) It therefore would be useful to trace in
some detail the history of subdivision exactions and how the courts
have dealt with the issue of their constitutionality.
In colonial times, it became customary to take land for road building through property owned by individuals, without paying compensation if it was undeveloped property, but with compensation if it was
already developed. 123 The theory was that construction of roads,
where there were none at all, was not a detriment but a benefit to the
owner affected. But if the owner's land was developed with roads already in the area, and his valuable land was being taken for widening
or extending roads into the lands of others, he ought to be compensated as he was suffering an overall loss from the new construction.
In the nineteenth century, subdividers began voluntarily to dedicate land to local government for roads and other public utilities such
as sewer and water lines. Their purpose, of course, was not altruistic
but rather to make the subdivision attractive to potential buyers, who
ordinarily would not be interested in land without such facilities. The
developers got other advantages as well, because when the city accepted the dedicated land, it became responsible for the future operation and maintenance of the facilities.
Since the 1920s and perhaps earlier, municipalities began to require
the subdivider to dedicate land for streets and to surface them as well,
in exchange for a permit to subdivide.124 In addition, the towns often
required that the developer pay for on-site water and sewer systems.
With the cities having the power under modern subdivision enabling
statutes to either permit a desired subdivision or to forbid it, it was
inevitable that some of them would exercise the power unfairly or
even in an extortionate manner. In the early cases, the courts generally allowed the cities great latitude in deciding what exactions should
be required, using the argument that subdivision was a mere privilege
2
that could be withheld unless certain conditions were met.1 s
123. F. BOSSELMAN & N. STROUD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT EXACTnONS in

DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 70 (J. Frank and R. Rhodes eds. 1987) [hereinafter
LEGAL ASPECTS].
124. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 738 (1981).
125. On the privilege theory, see, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich.
468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928). The court said: "In theory, at least, the owner of a subdi-

vision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets in return for the advantage
and privilege of having his plat recorded. Unless he does so, the law gives him no
right to have it recorded." Id. at 472, 217 N.W. at 59.
Occasionally, especially in the later cases, a court has, in egregious circum-

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:186

It should be noted that the subdivision exaction-requiring the developer to construct various capital improvements in exchange for the
right to subdivide-was not a great departure from what had been
done before to accomplish the construction of such facilities. Since
colonial times, cities had been using as a financing device, the special
assessment, in which abutting landowners were taxed to provide the
wherewithal to build improvements that specially benefited them. 2 6
Street paving and sewer construction were the most common improvements financed by this mechanism. If one thinks about the matter for
just a moment, the relation between the special assessment and the
subdivision exaction is obvious. Both require in the end that someone
other than municipal government pay for capital improvements. In
the case of the special assessment the owner of the land assessed bears
the burden initially, and if that person happens to be the developer, he
will try to pass that expense on to the ultimate consumer in the form
of higher land costs. In the case of the subdivision exaction, the developer ordinarily bears its initial cost, and he will likewise try to pass
that cost on to the consumer.
Financing construction of improvements through the use of the
special assessment has fallen into comparative desuetude since the
1930s. That period was one of extreme financial difficulty for the general economy and for municipalities as well. Property taxes and special assessments for such improvements as streets and sewers became
difficult to collect. After World War II, with the history of municipal
insolvency of the 1930s behind them, many states turned to subdivision exactions to finance construction of improvements formerly handled by use of the special assessment.27 In addition to the traditional
kinds of improvements such as streets and sewer lines, cities started to
demand that the developers dedicate land for parks and schools128 and
to contribute funds (called in lieu fees and impact fees) for the construction of on-site as well as off-site improvements.129
stances, required the repayment to the developer of an exaction that it thought
was unfairly extorted from him. See, e.g., West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of
Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966). In that case, the city forbade the developer
to use a billboard to advertise his development and threatened to withhold building permits unless he paid $300 per house toward a school building fund. The
court held that the legislature had not authorized the charge and that the payment was not "voluntary" but rather extracted under the duress of official
authority.
126. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 123, at 72.
127. See D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WiPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 314 (1978).
128. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 124, at 738.

129. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees:An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415 (1981). In the above article the

authors discuss the difference between "in lieu fees" and "impact fees". In the
former, the fee is in lieu of a required dedication of land when such is not feasible,
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The courts have responded to the growth of these subdivision exactions with a requirement that there be some relationship or nexus between the exaction and the needs caused by and benefits accruing to
the subdivision from it.130 Three different approaches to this requirement have appeared in the cases since the 1940s. They are: (1) the
reasonable relationship test; (2) the specifically and uniquely attributable test; and (3) the rational nexus test.'3 ' Simply stated, the pur-

pose of all three of these tests is to avoid putting a disproportionate
burden of infrastructure construction on a land supplier, developer, or
housing consumer, unless he has himself created the need sought to be
solved by the exaction. In other words, the policy is to prevent discrimination against the newer residents of a town and owners of undeveloped land by government acting to assist its older residents, who
are obviously in the political position of being able to mold its decisions and decision-making processes unfairly in their favor. Thus, in a,
sense, the subdivision exaction rule has equal protection 3 2 as well as
for example, where there is not enough land in the subdivision to dedicate for a
school. In that case, the subdivider is required to pay a fee instead of dedicating
some land. The impact fee is similar but is used where dedication of land for the
project is not appropriate because land is not really needed for it. As examples
they cite sewer and water facilities which can service an entire municipality. In
lieu fees are collected at the time subdivision approval is given by the town. Impact fees are collected at the time of issuance of building permits and are therefore usable where subdivision approval was given at a much earlier time,
development was delayed, and new needs caused by the construction are now
perceived.
130. In a dissenting opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), Justice
Scalia took a similar position with respect to a rent control ordinance, under
which a rent increase could be denied a landlord when the tenant would suffer
economic hardship as a result. Arguing that the landlord had not caused the poverty of the tenant, he could not justify a program to help tenants "privately
funded by those landlords who happen to have 'hardship' tenants."
131. See RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 65.03 at 65-98 through 65101 (1986); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22 (1989);
Holmes v. Planning Bd. of Town of New Castle, 78 A.D.2d 1, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1980).
Not every authority looks at these tests in the same way; some divide the cases
differently. Thus, Professors Juergensmeyer and Blake see two lines of authority
rather than three-the specifically and uniquely attributable test and the rational
nexus test. In their taxonomy the reasonable relationship and rational nexus
cases are lumped together in one category. They just regard some of the cases as
requiring more exactitude in calculating needs and benefits than others. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 129, at 430-33. For a similar analysis, see
LFGAL ASPECTS, supra note 123 at 73-81.
132. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine in detail the equal protection
ramifications of the mandatory set-aside device. The main reason for this is that
since the distinction between new and older residents is not a "suspect classification" calling for heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, any such
review of the classification would be less stringent than under the takings heightened scrutiny standard of the Nollan case. But it is interesting that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's Mount Laurel decisions, holding that inclusionary zon-
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takings connotations.
The loose reasonable relationship test was first applied in California in the leading case of Ayres v. City of Los Angeles' 3 3 , but more
clearly articulated later in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek.-34 In the latter case, in answer to a developer challenge of
exactions requiring dedication of lands or payment of fees in lieu
thereof for park and recreational purposes, the California Supreme
Court said that such "can be justified on the basis of a general public
need for recreational facilities caused by present and future subdivisions."13s Under this relatively relaxed standard of review, it is very

36
difficult to get a court to overturn an ordinance on nexus grounds,
the tendency being to hold there is no taking where the court finds the
proposed development is a contributing factor to the problem sought
to be alleviated.137 On the other hand, in Illinois and a few other
states, courts have on occasion followed the most rigid and demanding
test. Under it, the need for the new facilities met by the exaction must
be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the subdivision.138 In addition, funds collected as an exaction must be used solely for the bene-

ing is required by the equal protection clause because exclusionary zoning discriminates against low income groups, are themselves subject to equal protection
133.
134.
135.
136.

attack because the judicially mandated inclusionary devices irrationally discriminate against new residents of the town.
34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. (1971).
Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (1971).
Debney, Gordon, & Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.

PROBs. 139, 148 (1987).
137. See also in this connection, the famous Wisconsin case of Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) where the court held it
was sufficient if there was a "reasonable connection" between the need for the
new facilities sought and the growth pressures created by the subdivision. According to the court:
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove
that the land required to be dedicated for a park or a school site was to
meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into
the community to occupy this particular subdivision. On the other hand,
the municipality might well be able to establish that a group of subdivisions approved over a period of several years had been responsible for
bringing into the community a considerable number of people making it
necessary that the land dedications required of the subdividers be utilized for school, park and recreational purposes for the benefit of such
influx. In the absence of contravening evidence this would establish a
reasonable basis for finding that the need for the acquisition was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider.
Id. at 447. Thus did the court reject the earlier, strict, "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test of the Illinois court.
Also following this approach was Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d
78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
138. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961). See also Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d
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fit of the subdivision charged.13 9 It seems quite clear that this
approach has not garnered widespread support, and is probably not
strictly applied even in Illinois itself.40
The third approach to this problem has become known as the rational nexus test. In the leading case of Longridge Builders, Inc. v.
PlanningBoard of Princeton,141 the New Jersey court set a standard
somewhere between the laxity of the reasonable relationship test and
stringency of the specifically and uniquely attributable test. In that
case the court said: "It is clear to us that ...the subdivider Ican] be
compelled only to bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational
nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision" [emphasis added].142 The distinction between the reasonable
relationship and rational nexus approaches lies in the latter's requirement of a reasonably precise accounting of both the city's additional
needs attributable to the new subdivision as well as the benefits accruing to it from the exaction. If as a result of this calculation, the court
finds that the subdivision is bearing more than its fair share of the
costs of the new facilities-either because the exaction is out of proportion to the additional burden caused by, or benefits accruing to, the
subdivision-then it will strike the exaction down as an unconstitu43

tional taking.1

The courts of Utah144 and New Jersey145 in particular have stated

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.

910 (1970); Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 129, at 427-29; R. CUNNINGHAM,
W. STOEBUCK, & D. WmTmAN, THE LAW OF PRoPERTY 597 (1984).
See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 129, at 428-29 (citing Gulest Assocs., Inc.
v. Town of Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), qffl'd, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538
(App. Div. 1962)).
See Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 IMI.2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968).
I at 350, 245 A.2d at 337.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently described the rational nexus test as
requiring a "strong, almost but-for, causal nexus" between the development and
the creation of the need, while the reasonable relationship test requires only an
"indirect and general impact" on the need. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township
of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990). In that case, the court, without
stating any reason, announced that it would apply the reasonable relationship
test to inclusionary zoning problems instead of the rational nexus test it has traditionally applied to other subdivision exactions.
Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). In Banberry the court said:
Therefore, where the fee charged a new subdivision or a new property
hookup exceeds the direct costs incident thereto (as a means of sharing
the costs of common facilities), the excess must survive measure against
the standard that the total costs fall equitably upon those who are similarly situated and in a just proportion to benefits conferred. Stated otherwise, to comply with the standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee
related to services like water and sewer must not require newly developed properties to bear more than their equitable share of the capital
costs in relation to benefits conferred.
To determine the equitable share of the capital costs to be borne by
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in some detail the factors that must be considered by the courts to
determine whether the burden is being unconstitutionally applied.
Those jurisdictions have not been as detailed in their requirements of
calculations concerning benefit, but it is clear that they will insist
upon a reasonable benefit considering the amount of the exaction. 146
newly developed properties, a municipality should determine the relative burdens previously borne and yet to be borne by those properties in
comparison with the other properties in the municipality as a whole; the
fee in question should not exceed the amount sufficient to equalize the
relative burdens of newly developed and other properties.
Among the most important factors the municipality should consider
in determining the relative burden already borne and yet to be borne by
newly developed properties and other properties are the following, suggested by the well-reasoned authorities cited below: (1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2) the manner of financing existing capital
facilities (such as user charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general taxes, or federal grants); (3) the relative extent to which
the newly developed properties and the other properties in the municipality have already contributed to the cost of existing capital facilities
(by such means as user charges, special assessments, or payment from
the proceeds of general taxes); (4) the relative extent to which the newly
developed properties and the other properties in the municipality will
contribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5) the
extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a credit
because the municipality is requiring their developers or owners (by contractual arrangement or otherwise) to provide common facilities (inside
or outside the proposed development) that have been provided by the
municipality and financed through general taxation or other means
(apart from user charges) in other parts of the municipality; (6) extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly developed properties;
and (7) the time-price differential inherent in fair comparisons of
amounts paid at different times. [citing cases]
I&Lat 903-04. In an earlier case, the Utah court seemed to follow the less demanding reasonable relationship approach. Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257
(Utah 1980).
145. White Birch Realty Corp. v. Gloucester Township Mun. Util. Auth., 80 N.J. 165,
402 A.2d 927 (1979). See also New Jersey Builders Ass'n. v. Bernards Township.,
108 N.J. 223 (1987).
146. See, eg., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981)
(citations omitted):
The amount of such exactions or fees should be such that the burden of
providing these municipal services 'falls equitably upon those who are
similarly situated and in a just proportion to benefits conferred.' The
measurement of benefits conferred' may have a more significant impact
on the reasonableness of park fees than on water connection fees. The
central facilities that support water and sewer service would generally
confer the same benefits in every part of the municipality, but the benefits conferred by recreational, flood control, or other dispersed resources
may be measurably different in different parts of the municipality. Park
improvement fees should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in light
of the relative benefits conferred on, as well as the relative burdens previously borne and yet to be borne by the newly developed properties in
comparison with the other properties in the municipality as a whole. The
fees in question should not exceed the amount sufficient to equalize the
relative benefits and burdens of newly developed and other properties.
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The insistence upon a reasonable benefit in return for an exaction147 is fully justified, for there is no point in requiring that the subdivision increase the need for new facilities, if the exaction is not used
to serve that need. Where the exaction is in the form of facilities to be
constructed by the developer in the subdivision, it is usually clear that
the benefit requirement is met. But where the city is requiring the
dedication of land to be '"anked" for streets that might never be constructed, it has been held that this is an unconstitutional taking rather
And where the exaction
than a valid exercise of the police power1 48
is in the form of money payments-as many of them are-a detailed
examination of how the funds are utilized is obviously called for.
Some courts have required the earmarking of the funds for the purported purpose of the exaction, 149 while others have required that
there be a definite plan to build the projected facilities. 150
Let us look at mandatory set-aside from the standpoint of the
above cases on subdivision exactions, that require a nexus between the
exaction and the needs created by and benefits accruing to the subdivision. Under any of the three formulations, to sustain the constitutionality of the set-aside, one would have to show that construction of new
housing in a subdivision itself creates the need for more housing for
poor and moderate income persons.'51 In my view it is well-nigh im147. Some cases requiring that a benefit be provided by the exaction are Batch v.
Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22 (1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 N.C. 1, 387 S.E.2d 655 (1990); Holmdel Builders v. Holmdel Township 232 N.J. Super. 182, 556 A.2d 1236 (1989); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968). See also LEGAL ASPECTS,
supra note 123, at 80 and cases cited therein.
148. Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N.W.2d 297 (1980). The court
said:
A city may not, under the guise of the police power, require a property
owner to dedicate private property for some future public purpose as a
condition of obtaining a building permit without paying the property
owner just compensation, when the requested dedicated property is to be
placed in a land bank for future use by the city and such future use is not
directly occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.
Id.at 248, 292 N.W.2d at 302. See also Hart Realty Co. v. Wright Township Bd. of
Supervisors, 73 Pa. Commw. 117, 457 A.2d 240, where the court held it was an
"abuse of discretion" to require the construction on premises of a capped sewer
system to be connected to a municipal sewer system where there were no plans to
extend the latter to the area of the subdivision involved.
149. See, eg., Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329
So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983).
150. See, e.g., J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581,432 A.2d 12 (1981). See
also City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983), where
the lower court reached the result as a matter of constitutional law but the
supreme court reached it as a matter of statutory interpretation.
151. In Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277
(1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court recently announced that it would apply
the reasonable relationship test to inclusionary zoning problems instead of the
rational nexus test it has traditionally applied to other subdivision exactions. In
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possible to do that. Of course one could argue that a new subdivision
of middle income housing creates the need for dwellings for those
lower income persons who will be needed to service the subdivision. 152
But that clearly overlooks the fact that the persons who are moving
into the new subdivision will be vacating other housing which will
then "filter down" to the lower income families 1 5s. Certainly, the fact
that one can posit an absurd economic argument to support the validity of a regulation should not be sufficient to sustain it; it should have
at least some surface plausibility. Otherwise there would be no point
in courts conducting nexus reviews of legislation at all.
Much of the discussion of the affordable housing problem overlooks this filtering down process. It seems as if advocates of affordable
housing believe that the only way to provide more housing for the
poor is to build it. Historically, that just has not been the case. As
Messrs. Lansing, Clifton and Morgan stated in their empirical study of
housing markets in the United States:
The working of the market for housing is such that the poor will benefit
from any actions which increase the supply in the total market. There is a
natural tendency for someone who is concerned with the provision of housing
for the poor to take a direct approach. To provide housing for people, hand
them the key to the door of a home! The evidence in this research is that the
direct approach is not the only approach which will be effective. The housing
market (for whites) operates as a single market. Any policy which shifts
either the demand curve or the supply curve in the market will affect the
price in the total market. 1 5 4

This country has always housed its poor citizens through the construction of housing for more affluent families, whose old housing filters down to the poor. Thus it is clear that the construction of new
middle income housing does not create the need for low income housing but rather contributes to meeting that need. In addition, most emthat case, the court seemed to hold (without explanation) that a mandatory setaside requirement was valid under that test.
152. See Kleven, supra note 14, at 1495.
153. For a discussion of the filtering down process, see W. TUCKER, supra note 90, at
83-89; Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1184-86. The classic empirical study on the subject of filtering down is J. LANSING, C. CLIFTON, & J. MORGAN, NEW HoMEs AND
POOR PEOPLE (1969).

154. NEw HOMEs AND POOR PEOPLE, supra note 153, at 68. The authors found one
flaw in the operation of the market, viz., that blacks were underrepresented in
the sequence of moves resulting from construction of new housing as compared to
their white counterparts of the same income, id at 49-56, and that "measures
which increase the supply of housing in the market as a whole influence the market for housing for Negroes only in an attenuated form." Id. at 68. Thus at the
time of the study, poor blacks benefited from construction of new middle income
housing but not as much as poor whites did. Even assuming that this situation
continues today in spite of fair housing legislation, still one could not argue that
construction of new middle income housing actually creates a need for more
housing for any group.
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ployees in this country are willing to and do commute to work. 5
Construction of housing built expressly for persons who service a new
subdivision is no more necessary than would be construction of proximitous places of employment for the subdivision's commuting
6
residents.15
In summary, it can therefore be said that, since under any of the
three formulations of the tests for the constitutionality of subdivision
exactions, one must show that the new development exacerbates the
problem of housing for the poor-something that cannot fairly be
shown-it should be held that the mandatory set-aside is unconstitutional as a taking, unless compensation is paid to the developer.57
155. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1212 (1981).
156. A somewhat closer question is presented when a fee is assessed upon nonresidential developers to fund support for low cost housing, a so-called linkage ordinance.
It has been argued that construction of commercial buildings creates the need for
affordable housing, because additional workers are necessarily brought into the
region to staff the new facilities. See, e.g., Kayden & Pollard, Linkage Ordinances

and TraditionalExactions Analysis: The Connection Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 127 (1987). It is not clear, however, why private enterprise will not supply the needed additional housing at
reasonable cost, as long as city authorities do not artificially limit the amount of
land available for residential purposes by anti-growth zoning ordinances. The
same filtering down process to lower income persons would then occur. In the
usual subdivision exaction case, the need created by the subdivision (e.g., for
parks and schools) cannot be satisfied by the private market and there is greater
justification to impost the obligation on the builders and consumers of the housing.
In addition to the need requirement, there is also the requisite under the rational nexus test that the exaction benefit the nonresidential facility burdened
with the exaction. It seems quite tenuous to argue that construction of affordable
housing so directly benefits that facility.
157. In a recent case the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held
that mandatory set-asides "must be accompanied by density bonuses in order to
compensate the developer for the cost of constructing the Mount Laurel housing.
Without such benefits, developers have no economic incentive to build such housing, and thus no 'realistic opportunity' is offered by the ordinance to satisfy the
municipalities' Mount Laurel obligation." Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township
of Holmdel, 232 N.J. Super. 182,196-97, 556 A.2d 1236, 1243 (App. Div. 1989). The
court did not specifically hold that an uncompensated mandatory set-aside would
be a taking but the thrust of the argument requiring compensation probably
should be read to make that case.
However, on appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while not reaching the
question, implied that when presented therewith, it would hold that such was not
a taking.
Since initial authority for promulgating development-fee regulations lies
with COAH, we do not reach the question of when, if ever, compensatory
benefits might have to accompany mandatory development fees. As long
as the measures promulgated are not confiscatory and do not result in an
inadequate return on investment, there would be no constitutional injury. We leave it to COAH to determine initially the level at which fees
might become confiscatory.
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C. Density Bonuses as Compensation
If, as we have argued here, under either the Nollan approach or the
subdivision exaction approach, mandatory set-asides would be invalid
as takings unless compensation is paid, there still is the question of
whether the density bonuses that often accompany set-asides can and
do provide adequate compensation to the builders and their customers.
Consider first the matter of adequacy of compensation. Presumably one would measure that by comparing the total net revenues the
developer would have had without the set-aside with those he actually
received with it. A study indicates that even where there is a density
bonus of one additional unit for every affordable unit, a developer
would lose more on the inclusionary units than he would gain from
the density bonus and therefore there would be a loss in net revenues
as a result.158 However, there is also evidence that many builders
deem density bonuses adequate compensation.159 Perhaps this is because they are adequate, or perhaps it is because the builders feel that
in a tight housing market they can pass the increased costs on to the
consumers of regularly priced housing and/or to the landowners who
supply the land.
Of course, if the density bonus does actually fully compensate the
builder for any losses he incurs in selling units below cost, then
neither he nor his customers for regularly priced housing would be
directly paying for the subsidy and there would be no taking. It
Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 582, 583 A.2d 277,
293 (1990).
158. See CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASS'N., THE FEASIBILITY OF THE DENSITY BoNUS IN RELATION TO THE INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS 53-103 (1980)(pre-

pared by Connerly & Assocs., Inc.) cited in Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1180-81.
159. It seems that builders are desirous of building with density bonuses as compensation for a mandatory set-aside. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1989, § B, at 1:
New Jersey's Mount Laurel housing plan is probably the most painless way to build low- and moderate-income housing in suburban
America. Developed after 12 years of court battles, the state plan sets a
quota of subsidized units for each suburb. But it doesn't cost the suburbs
one cent. The builder pays for it. And builders love it. They make more
profit.
How? They get zoning variances to build more units per acre. For
example, Mahwah used to allow six condominiums per acre. To meet its
subsidized goal it now allows builders 14 units per acre. Eleven selling at
market rate (typically $150,000) and three subsidized (about $50,000).
And the builders have a financial incentive to make the units nice:
otherwise the regular units won't sell.
See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § 10, at 9 which describes a builder who paid
Warren Township $3 million to have its 365 acres rezoned from acre and a half to
one acre zoning. That works out to an additional 122 lots at a cost of approximately $24,600 per lot. The money was used to fund a regional contribution
agreement to enable the building of affordable housing in New Brunswick. And
in Scotch Plains a builder paid the city $36,000 per additional lot to get the city to
rezone a 75 acre parcel from one acre to one-third acre zoning.
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should be noted, however, that the reason this is true is that restrictive
low density zoning reduces the value per acre of land zoned for single
family housing. First the government adversely affects the value of
land suitable for development by its restrictive zoning;, then it says
that it will increase the value of that land by lifting those restrictions
somewhat if the builder-landowner sells some of the housing he constructs at an artificially low price. It is clear that if the city does this
all in one fell swoop in order to force the builder to subsidize the poor,
the courts will strike the measures down as a sham.l60 But should the
result be any different just because the regulations were enacted over
a period of years? If the low density zoning was necessary to protect
the health, welfare, and safety of the people at the time it was enacted,
(and, after all, that is the purported justification for restrictive zoning)
why is low density zoning no longer necessary to achieve those ends,
now that government has decided that affordable housing at higher
densities is the new desideratum? The real problem is that low density zoning itself is on very shaky constitutional ground, though the
courts have long accepted the pretexts offered in justification of it.161
As long as courts continue to do that, however, there is little reason to
believe that mandatory set-asides accompanied by adequate density
bonuses will be invalidated.
Now suppose that the density bonus offered by the city does not
fairly compensate the builder for the losses he incurs in the sale of
affordable housing. As mentioned above, 162 if he cannot pass the increased costs on to the consumers of regularly priced housing because
the town in question has no unique characteristics, he will try to pass
them on to the owners of undeveloped land in the area. In such case,
it is those owners who would have the takings claim. And if the town
has unique characteristics, the developer will try to pass the increased
costs on to the consumer as well as the landowner. There both such
groups would have a legitimate takings argument. And these results
make eminently good sense. It should be remembered that the purpose of the rules requiring a nexus between the exaction and the
needs created by and benefits accruing to a subdivision, is to avoid putting an unfairly disproportionate burden of infrastructure construction on the parties not responsible for creating the need for it.
Imposing the costs of lower income subsidies upon the suppliers of
land or upon the new residents of the town would seem to violate the
160. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 232 N.J. Super 182, 203-04, 556
A.2d 1236 (1989), aff'd in part,121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
161. Most of the cases support low density or large lot zoning. See, e.g., Zygmont v.
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 153 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965). But see Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964) and the cases collected in 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, G. NELSON, W. STOEBUCK, & D.
WHITMAN, BASIc PROPERTY LAW 1166-70 (1989).

162. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
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fundamental principle that a few persons, who have not caused a societal problem, but who are fortuitously in a position to bear the cost of
ameliorating it, should not be forced to do so, where those costs should
fairly be borne by the citizens of the town in general. In the words of
the U.S. Supreme Court, "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."'163 Thus, both because the developer's proposed new use in no way creates a public need that the
mandatory set-aside is serving to fulfill, and because the set-aside does
not achieve its supposed purpose of dispersal of the poor, a mandatory
set-aside ordinance not providing adequate compensation should be
voided as a taking.
VII.

AN OVERALL VIEW

The courts of this country have been presented with a terrible dilemma, and not of their own making. The legislatures, state and municipal, have (albeit with court approval) saddled the system of
housing distribution with a regulatory structure so complex, onerous,
and costly that the result is housing that is too expensive for most
Americans who have not already gotten on the escalator. Residential
rent control, enacted in many cities along both coasts, has the ostensible purpose of protecting the public from rent gouging by "monopolistic landlords", though no one has satisfactorily explained how
hundred of landlords in a city could possibly have monopoly power.
Rather, for obvious reasons, rent control has had a terribly inhibiting
effect upon the construction of new rental housing, benefiting those,
almost invariably in the middle class, who happen to be in a rental
when the regulations are instituted, and in the process harming everyone else in society. Housing shortages, in the form of a low vacancy
rate, are almost universally used as a justification for rent control,164
but the fact is that the shortages do not precede rent control but
rather follow almost inexorably from its introduction.6 5 The fact that
163. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
164. The following is typical: "Rent control begins with the premise that rents are
being unfairly inflated as a result of failure in the free operation of the rental
housing market--e.g., housing shortages, monopoly power, etc." Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 623, 350 A.2d 34, 44 (1975).
165. William Tucker studied the relationship between rent control and vacancy rates
in his recent book. He found that the nine cities that had rent control out of the
fifty major cities studied indeed had the lowest vacancy rates. He also found that
no rent control city had a vacancy rate over 3% and all but one non-rent control
city had vacancy rates over 4% and ranging as high as 18%. W. TUCKER, supra
note 90, at 63. But more importantly he found that the cities that imposed rent
control in the 1970s had a normal vacancy rate in the 1970 census and that "[iln
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rent control exists in almost every New Jersey community has no
doubt contributed to the shortage of housing for the poor in that state.
Zoning, whose supposed purpose is to protect the health, welfare,
safety, and morals of society. 6 6 has very little to do with all that. The
Law of Unintended Consequences has operated here as well. Zoning's
effects (and indeed the real goals of its strongest advocates in each
community) have been two: first, the protection of the community's
politically entrenched middle class from incursions by other "less desirable" persons, or, for that matter, by "too many" of the same class;
and, second, the protection of the community's politically entrenched
business people from too much competition. The result of the first
above mentioned factors is that in the highly populated parts of the
country, where exclusionary zoning is the norm, the amount of land
available for construction is sharply limited, in turn causing rapidly
escalating prices for land and, therefore, new housing.167 With higher
prices for new housing, there is less demand, less is built, shortages
every city where rent control has been adopted, the regulatory action has preceded low vacancy rates." Id- at 71.
166. The statutory provisions purporting to state the purposes of zoning were borrowed by most of the state legislatures from a United States Department of Commerce model zoning enabling act. It provided as follows:
Sec. 1. Grant of Power. For the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of
cities and incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of a lot that may be occupied, the size of yards,
courts, and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location
and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence,
or other purposes.
Sec. 3. Purposes in View. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote
health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; and to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERcE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT
(1926).
167. The severity of the problem is fully explored in W. TucKER, supra note 90. He
describes a Newark Star-Ledger study as follows:
In a nine-part study of housing costs undertaken in 1989 by the Newark Star-Ledger,the newspaper concluded that 'it is not the value of labor or building materials that are pushing the average price of homes
beyond many, but rather the uncontrolled growth of a massive and
costly system of regulation and bureaucracy, much of which has been
found to be wasteful.' The Star-Ledgerestimated that as much as 35 percent of the cost of a new house in New Jersey is now due to regulation.
East Coast developer Ara K. Hovnanian told The Star-Ledger he can
build a four-bedroom house in any major North Carolina market for
$95,000, getting through regulatory approval in three months. In New
Jersey, the same house will cost $230,000 and take three years of regula-
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ensue, and prices for existing housing inexorably go up under the
pressure of increasing population.168 The political support for zoning
is explainable by the fact that more than half the population owns
their own homes and rising prices are more than palatable to those
persons.
The courts in the more populated parts of the country are thus
faced with a housing "shortage" that has been created in great part by
market-frustrating regulation. Perhaps, if it were back in 1926 and
the U.S. Supreme Court had it to do all over again, the Court, blessed
with the knowledge that we have today, would strike all zoning down
as a taking instead of upholding it as it did;169 but it is probably way
too late for that. The courts today are seized with the problem of dealing with the ensuing mess. It is unfortunate that the New Jersey
Supreme Court and many of the towns in the country have adopted
self-defeating inclusionary zoning measures to solve the problems created in great part by exclusionary zoning measures. Maybe the best
that we can hope for is that the federal courts will, under the evolving
rules concerning takings, strike these latest measures down, as making a bad situation worse. In the meantime, the Mount Laurel cases
serve to teach us all, once again, the lesson that excessive arrogation of
power to the judiciary, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, is itself a dangerous tendency in a representative democracy.

tory review-with much greater risk that it will never be approved at all
Id at 79. See also W. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws (1985); B.
SiEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); ROGERS, HOMELESSNESS, THE POOR,
AND LOCAL PROPERTY REGULATION, ANTITHESIS, Vol. 1, No.3 30 (1990).

168. Marin County, across the Golden Gate Bridge from San Francisco, is the perfect
example of what exclusionary regulation can "accomplish." In 1970, the median
home in the county cost $33,000, within a few thousand dollars of the national
median. The residents of the county used the following devices over the ensuing
years to block further home construction: (1) induced the federal government to
purchase a large portion of the seashore area for use as a national seashore; (2)
blocked freeway access to the new national seashore making the area as a practical matter accessible only to county residents using local roads; (3) passed a law
forbidding farmers from selling off parcels of less than 60 acres for home construction purposes; (4) blocked acquisition of new sources of water to prevent
additional development; (5) some municipalities of the county passed ordinances
requiring a minimum 20 acre lot to build a home. The result of all this is that

Main County has the highest housing prices in the country, the median price of a
home in 1990 being $224,000.
169. City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

